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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
TRADE CO~l~IISSION OF UTAH 
' Plaintiff and Respondent, 
UTAH RETAIL GROCERS ASSO-
CIATION and GEORGE INGALLS, 
d/b/a George's ~larket, 
Plaintiffs in Intervention 
and Respondents, 
vs. 
JAl\IES L. BUSH, d/b/a Bush Super 
~1arket, 
Defendant and Appellant . 
Case no. 
7783 
. PETITION FOR REHEARING AND 
- BRIEF IN SUPPORT THEREOF 
TO THE HONORABLE MEMBERS OF THE 
SUPREME COURT OF UTAH: 
Come now the plaintiffs who are respondents in the 
above entitled cause and petition the Court to grant a 
rehearing of this matter for the following reasons, more 
particularly elaborated in the accompanying brief: 
1. The Court erred by deciding in effect that the 
issuance by the defendant of S & H Green Stamps, repre-
senting a two per cent cash discount, in connection with 
the sale of items marked up six per cent did not violate 
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the "sales-below-cost" provisions of the Unfair Prac 
tices Act. 
2. The Court erred by deciding in effect that the 
1narkup on goods required by the Unfair Practices Act 
is not separately computed for each item sold. 
3. The Court erred by treating this case, a civil 
proceeding for injunctive relief, as a criminal case, thus 
imposing a greater burden of proof on plaintiffs than 
is required by law. 
4. The Court erred by holding that an intent by 
the defendant to injure competition was not proved when 
uncontradicted evidence in the record showed that such 
an intent was proved. 
5. The Court erred by ignoring an alternative 
method of proof allowed by the Unfair Practices Act, 
proof that the effect of defendant's actions was to injure 
competition. 
6. The Court erred by holding that the only purpose 
of the Unfair Practices Act is to curb monopolies where-
as the plain language and intent of the Act shows that 
it is also designed to promote fair methods of competi-
tion. 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF' PETITION 
FOR REHEARING 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts are as stated in the briefs of both parties 
submitted for the original hearing of this case. 
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STATE.JIENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
CASH DISCOUNTS ON SALES MARKED UP NO MORE 
THAN THE STATUTORY SIX PER CENT DO REDUCE THE 
SALE PRICE BELOW COST. 
POINT II 
THE COURT ERRONEOUSLY ASSUMED THAT THE 
BELOW COST PROVISIONS OF THE STATUTE DO NOT 
APPLY TO EACH ITEM SOLD. 
POINT III 
THE COURT ERRONEOUSLY ASSUMED THAT IN THIS 
PROCEEDING FOR AN INJUNCTION, A CIVIL NOT A 
CRil\IINAL REMEDY, PROOF BEYOND A REASONABLE 
DOUBT WAS REQUIRED. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT ERRONEOUSLY DETERMINED THAT AN 
INTENT TO INJURE COMPETITION WAS NOT PROVED. 
POINT V 
THE COURT IGNORED AN ALTERNATIVE METHOD 
OF PROOF OF THE VIOLATION, PROOF THAT THE 
EFFECT WAS TO INJURE COMPETITION. 
POINT VI 
THE PURPOSES OF THE UNFAIR PRACTICES ACT 
ARE TO PROHIBIT UNFAIR AND DISCRIMINATORY 
PRACTICES BY WHICH FAIR AND HONEST COMPETI-
TION IS DESTROYED OR PREVENTED AS WELL AS TO 
SAFEGUARD THE PUBLIC AGAINST THE CREATION OR 
PERPETRATION OF MONOPOLIES. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
CASH DISCOUNTS ON SALES MARKED UP NO MORE 
THAN THE STATUTORY SIX PER CENT DO REDUCE THE 
SALE PRICE BELOW COST. 
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With deference to the Court's opinion it is respect-
fully submitted that in prohibiting "sales below cost" 
the Legislature did not intend, as the Court implies, that 
such prohibited sales were to be determined solely by 
"which of two technical and debatable accounting 
philosophies maintains." 
In the Unfair Practices Act with which we are 
dealing here the Legislature was not speculating with 
"debatable accounting philosophies" in prescribing what 
was or what was not a "sale below cost." It prohibited 
all sales "below cost" with the requisite intent or effect 
and did not exempt from its prohibitory language sales 
below the arbitrary six per cent markup as long as the 
amount below the arbitrary markup was no more than 
"usual and custmnary" whether by way of "cash dis-
count" or otherwise. In plain unequivocal language the 
Legislature said that "in the absence of proof of a lesser 
cost" the markup on a. sale "shall be six per cent." When 
the arbitrary markup rather than the actual cost of 
doing business is used in establishing selling price the 
markup must be six per cent and not something less than 
six per cent. The Legislature did not say, nor can it 
reasonably be inferred from anything it did say, that if 
it is usual and customary to grant "cash discounts" the 
markup on a sale need be only six per cent less what-
ever "cash discounts" are usual and customary. The 
merchant is given the option of marking up his merchan-
dise on one of two basis, viz: the 6% statutory markup-
or his actual cost of doing business but he may not use 
the arbitrary markup and then make a "deduction" from 
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that markup however small or large and regardless of 
whether the deduction is or is not "'usual and customary." 
\\~hen this Court savs that ''Unassailed also is 
. ' ' ' 
expert accounting testiinony showing that a cash dis-
count custon1arily is considered as a non-operating 
business expense, like advertising, accounting and simi-
lar expense, includable in the cost of doing business, and 
also that the an1ount represented by the stamps, roughly 
:2% is about the going rate of cash discounts.", does 
it mean to imply that for any or even all of those reasons 
"cash discounts'' do not reduce the selling price1 There 
is certainly no expert accounting testimony to support 
that proposition. In discussing the handling :by the 
defendant in his books of account of S & H Green Trad-
ing Stmnps, :Jir. l(elly told how they were and how they 
should properly be handled from an accounting stand-
point. Xowhere did he say that they did or did not 
reduce the selling price. The only inference which can 
be drawn from his testimony however, is that they do 
reduce the selling price because he stated that under 
ordinary circumstances "cash discounts" were considered 
as sales losses. IIis testimony at page 189 of the record 
is as follows: 
"Q. You may state whether or not they are 
charged as an expense or how they are 
charged in the record of the retail trade 1 
A. There is different methods of handling cash 
discounts. I would say the general accepted 
practice is to handle cash discounts as a 
finance and management expense. 
Q. \Vould you say that is the way in Utah 1 
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A. Under ordinary circumstances, cash discounts 
might be considered as a sales loss. 
Q. Would you say that is the prevailing practice 
in the State of Utah 1 
A. Well, I would say its generally accepted as 
accounting practices and as far as my experi-
ence is concerned, I would say its the prevail ... 
ing practice, those that I've seen. I might 
add that the accounting authorities would 
support that theory, although there are some 
differences in accounting authorities on it." 
Mr. Kelly also testified that regardless of how "caRh 
discounts" were handled from an accounting standpoint 
it would make no difference on the net profit. Likewise 
he testified that this defendant handled "cash discounts" 
as an "operating expense" rather than as a "non-
operating business expense" which the Court states was 
the custom. His testimony to that effect is found on 
page 204 of the record as follows: 
"Q. Would you say that in essence that charge 
is treated as an operating expense 7 
MR. R.AMPTON: I object to that as a leading 
question. 
THE COURT: I'll hear the answer. 
A. Certainly it's treated in his books as an 
advertising expense from what the witness 
said here on the stand, which is an operating 
expense. 
Q. And is that in essence a proper way to treat 
it from the standpojnt of sound accounting~ 
A. Well, I would say that that would probably 
be an acceptable method from the under-
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standing that the particular n1erchant has a::; 
to what it is under his circtunstances. I might 
treat it a little differently from that. As I 
said this morning, I think it was rnore prob-
ably in the nature of advertising or service 
eost. As far as the effect on the operating 
staternent is concerned and the net profit it 
wouldn't make a particle of difference. It 
would be exactly the same." 
llr. Kelly went on further to point out precisely the 
difference between advertising and insurance expenses 
and the expenses incurred by the giving of "cash dis-
counts'' by stating that in the one case the customer 
receives a direct benefit and in the other he does not. 
His testimony along that line is found at pages 210 and 
211 of the record as follows: 
"Q. Well, does the insurance of the merchant, 
regardless of what the amount is, in con-
nection with the price that the customer has 
to pay, does that ever result in any benefit 
to the customer~ 
A. It never gets any payment to the customers. 
The customer never receives anything from 
it that is tangible. 
Q. And he definitely receives a right to benefit 
when he receives a green stamp. 
A. That's right, he does. Quite a case, Judge." 
As ~Ir. Kelly pointed out accounting authorities do 
recognize different methods of handling "cash discounts" 
in the books of account and that they do represent a 
"price reduction." In Finney, Principles of Accounting, 
\r ol. 1, page 38 is found the following: 
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"Three different opinions are held wit}. 
respect to the proper classification of cash dis-
counts on purchases and sales: 
( 1) Cash discounts are a deduction from 
the price; therefore, discounts on sales 
should be deducted from sales, and dis-
counts on purchases should be deducted 
from purchases. 
(2) Discounts are 
interest, and 
treated. 
financial items like 
should be similarly 
( 3) If discounts are less than 2% they 
should be treated as financial items; 
if more than 2%, they should be treated 
as deductions from purchases and 
sales, because a rate of discount 
greater than 2% is so large a:s to be 
disproportionate to interest." 
See also Hatfield, Accounting, pages 368-9; William 
Morse Cole, Accounts, Their Construction and Interpre-
tation, R-evised and Enlarged Edition, page 340. 
The different methods of handling "cash discounts" 
from an accounting standpoint are merely for the con-
venience of the particular merchant. The Unfair Prac-
tices Act is not concerned with that. It says merely that 
when the 1nerchant employs the statutory six per cent 
markup as the markup on his merchandise, there must 
not be a deduction from that markup, large or small, 
customary or not and whether by way of cash discount 
or otherwise. 
While accounting authorities differ as to the proper 
method of handling "cash discounts" in the preparation 
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of various financial statements, there is no authority 
which que8tions that a ''discount" does not in fact effect 
a "'reduction.'' In 26 C.J.8. 1333 the term "discount" is 
defined as follows: 
•• In a general sense, the term may be under-
stood as a counting off, something taken off or 
deducted, a reduction. ~lore specifically, in nler-
cantile transactions, an allowance on an account, 
debt, de1nand, price asked, and the like, an allow-
ance or deduction generally of so n1uch per cent 
made for prepayment or for prompt payment of 
a ·bill or account." 
"\Vhen a "cash discount" is offered on a sale, its effect 
on the sale price, as distinguished from how it may or 
may not be shown in the accounting records, is to. reduce 
the sales price--the custorner actually paying less and the 
merchant actually receiving less on the sale. To the 
effect that a "discount" is an "abatement," a "deduction," 
a "reduction," or the "difference" between the face 
amount and the lower cash sales price see the following: 
Napier v. John V. Farwell Co., 60 Colo. 319, 153 P. 694; 
Pit·st Nat. Ba;nk v. Sherburne, 14 Ill. App. 566; Over-
street v. Ha;ncock, 177 S. vV. 217 (Tex); Carroll v. Drury, 
170 Ill. 571, 49 N. E. 311; Salmon Falls Bank v. Leyser, 
22 S. W. 504, 116 Mo. 51; Anderson v. Cleburne Building 
& Loan Ass'n, 16 S. W. 298 (Tex); National Bank v. 
Johnson, 104 U. S. 271, 26 L. Ed. 7 42; Y oungblo·od v. 
Burmingham Trust & Savings Co., 95 Ala. 521, 12 So. 
579 20 L. R. A. 58, 36 Am. St. Rep. 245; Neillsville Bank 
v. Tuthill, 30 N. W. 154, 4 Dak. 295; Building Ass'n v. 
Seegmiller, 35 Pa. 225; Industrial Savings & Loan Co. of 
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Charleston v. Schultz, W. V. A., 185 S. E. 3; and, Dodge 
Bros. v. United States, C. C. A. Md., 118 F. 2d 95. 
Also we again respectfully cite the Court's attention 
to the language of the court in Bristol-Meyers Co. v. 
Picker, et al, 302 N. Y. 61, 96 N. E. 2d 177, as follows: 
''Assuming that there is no essential differ-
ence between the use of trading stamps and cash 
register receipts which are redeemable, and that 
either may be regarded as a form of cash dis-
count, I nevertheless cannot agree with the opinion 
in the cases cited that such a discount does not 
cut the sales price of an article. No matter how 
one puts it, the consumer who is accorded a cash 
discount in reality pays that much less for the· 
article which he purchases, and this is none the 
less true because the return is by way of merch-
andise rather than coin which may purchase 
merchandise. When defendants sold plaintiff's 
products at fair trade prices, and as. a part of 
the same transaction gave their customers cash 
register receipts having a redemption value of 
2¥2% of such fair trade prices, they, in effect, 
sold plaintiff's products at 2¥2% les'S than the 
prices fixed. I can see no distinction between 
returning to the customer a credit memorandum 
of 2¥2% and giving him a cash register receipt. 
And whether the discount is small or large makes 
no difference-the statute forbids both." 
The conclusion of the court that because a two per 
cent "cash discount" is recognized by industry as usual 
and customary, a reduction in the price of the article 
does not therefore result, is unsound and without founda-
tion. Here we are not dealing with "industry" generally. 
The defendant in this ca:se was an admitted "cash and 
10 
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l'arry'' retail g-rocer. The record is void of any evidence 
that it was usual and rustomary for any retail grocers, 
whether "eash and carry'' or "credit and delivery" to 
grant cash disrounts. The only evidence concerning 
"ra~h disrounts" was that the defendant granted "cash 
discounts" by Ineans of S & FI Green Trading Stamps 
and testiuwny that "generally," "cash discounts" do not 
exceed two per cent. Neither Mr. Kelly nor anyone else 
testified that it was "nsnal and customary" for retail 
grocery n1erchants to grant cash discounts and it cannot 
reasonably be inferred frmn any evidence in the record 
that ther·e was such a custom. It is to be noted in this 
connection that the Unfair Practices Act was enacted 
in 1937 and at least as far as the record in this case 
reveals, neither the defendant nor any other retail gro-
cery n1erchant granted "cash di!scounts" until shortly 
before the Trade Commission attempted to enjoin the 
defendant herein from making sales below cost . 
. \s~uredly the Court does not wish to imply or infer that 
a custom coming into being after the enactment of a 
statute, even assuming auguendo that the defendant 
herein did initiate a custom in the retail grocery business 
of granting "cash discounts," amends or modifies an 
existing statute ! ! ! It is a generally accepted rule that 
a usage or custom in conflict with an existing statutory 
provision is void. Moreover, no custom, however long 
and generally followed, can nullify the plain meaning 
and purpose of a statute. 50 Am. Jur., Statutes, Sec. 297. 
Purportedly in justification of the assertion that a 
two percent "cash discount" does not amount to a reduc-
11 
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tion of the sales price the court states that there is sup-
port for the proposition that a $1.00 price is constant 
''whether the cash and carry merchant returns 2¢ as a 
discount" or "whether the credit merchant, for extended 
credit, finally may receive $1.02 for the item." We 
~eriously doubt whether the cited authorities do in fact 
support such a proposition but in any event there is no 
evidence in this record, by inference or otherwise, to 
back up that statement. rrhe evidence is that on such 
sales no merchant received any premium payment 
whether $1.02 or something else and on the contrary the 
uncontradicted evidence shows that on such sales the 
defendant granted "cash discounts" of approximately 
two per cent thus in effect receiving only $0.98. 
The statements in both the majority opinion and 
the separate concurring opinion that a two per cent 
discount does not amount to a reduction in the price of 
the article but that a discount substantially in excess 
of two per cent may, because two per cent is the custo-
mary discount for cash, is unsound. In the first place, 
as pointed out above, there is no evidence of any "usual 
and customary" "cash discounts" in the retail grocery 
business. If,urthermore a "cash discount" reducing the 
arbitrary markup prescribed by the statute by any 
amount however large or small would the in direct con-
flict with the plain meaning and purpose of the statute. 
The Court apparently assumes however that such a 
practice would be all right because, as the Court says, 
in addition to being "usual and customary" his stamp 
cost is "an element of the cost of doing busine1SS intended 
12 
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by the Legislature to be one of the costs of doing busi-
ness included in the 6% Inarkup." Conceding as we do 
that "eash discounts" are one of the costs of doing busi-
ness. does the Court 1nean that when such discounts are 
two per cent tht>y are one of the costs of doing business 
but when more than two per cent they are not one of 
the costs of doing business~ 
POINT II 
THE COURT ERRONEOUSLY ASSUMED THAT THE 
BELO\V COST PROVISIONS OF THE STATUTE DO NOT 
APPLY TO EACH ITEM SOLD. 
The record shows, and the Court notes in its opinion, 
that: 
""About 25% of the iten1s are so-called 6% 
items,-staples ordinarily sold by merchants at 
cost as defined in the Act, * * * ." 
The Court further states in its opinion: 
"Only one out of 1000 sales possibly could be 
construed as a violation of the Act, * * * ." 
And again, the Court states : 
"Incredible it seems that one would intend to 
violate a criminal statute by inducing,-or, if you 
please, 'luring to improvidence,'-a single house-
wife out of about 1000, with bait of 8.3¢ in cash 
or 10.4¢ in merchandise on an average $5.00 pur-
chase, occuring but once in a $5,000 sales volume. 
* * ... " 
It is clear frmn this that the Court is of the opinion that 
a sale below cost occurs only when a single item is sold 
at less than six percent or only when the average markup 
of a nuwJber of items sold together is less than six per 
cent. This is an erroneous interpretation of the Act. 
13 
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In the first place, there is no evidence that only ont 
1n a thousand sales would be affected. The defendant 
Bush made such a statement but on cross-examination 
admitted that this was not a fact but merely an exaggera-
tion, a loose figure of speech, an arbitrary figure not 
based on his personal knowledge, and was designed only 
to indicate that very few customers bought six per cent 
items exclusively in a single purchase (R. 221-222). 
The Court's assumption is based on an interpreta-
tion of Section 13-5-9 which provides: 
"For the purpose of preventing evasion of 
the provisions of this act in all sales involving 
more than one item or commodity and in all sales 
involving the giving of any concession of any kind 
whatsoever (whether it be coupons or otherwi8e) 
the vendor's or di·stributor's selling price shall 
not be below the cost of all articles, products, 
commodities and concessions included in such 
transactions." 
By its terms, this section is designed specifically to 
prevent, not allow, evasions of the Act. The intent seems 
clear. It is intended to prevent evasions through so-
called "combination sales," "one-cent sales," bonus sales, 
etc. It is common to sell two items for a single price or 
two items for a single price plus one cent, for example: 
two tubes of toothpaste sold as a unit for a single price 
or two tubes sold for the price of one plus one cent. 
'rhus, in interpreting a similar provision in the Minne-
sota act, the Minnesota Attorney General has declared: 
"To give away a tumbler with each bottle 
of gingerale purchased is not prohibited unless 
14 
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the price paid is below the cost of both the ginger-
ale and the tumbler." (Opinions, Attorney Gen-
eral of Minnesota, ~lay :2G, 1937, 2 C.C.H. Trade 
Reg. Reporter No. 8-1:28.~30). 
Under the Louisiana act, the Attorney General of 
Louisiana states: 
.. ~\ gift iten1 of n1erchandise may be given 
away in connection with the sale of another item, 
but the cost of the item sold must be determined 
by adding together the cost of both items." (2 
C.C.H. Trade Reg. Reporter No. 8328.30). 
The Attorney General of .Korth Dakota has stated: 
"The act does not prohibit the sale of several 
articles as a unit or a combined price where the 
articles are sold as an indivisible unit and the sale 
price of the unit exceeds or is equal to the com-
bined cost." (2 C.C.H. Trade Reg. Reporter No. 
8648.11). 
In State v. Tankar Gas, 250 Wise. 218, 26 N.W. 2d 
647, the \Yisconsin Supreme Court in construing a pro-
vision similar to Sec. 13-5-9 stated: 
"The legislature sought by the unfair sales 
act to prevent transactions in which considered as 
a whole there was a sale of goods at less than cost 
for the purpose of unfairly attracting business. 
The typical loss-leader involved the sale of a 
single item at less than cost in order to attract 
patronage to the place of business of the adver-
tiser. A possibility of evasion existed in the case 
of the sale of various items for a combined price 
or the offering of gifts in connection with the sale 
of other things. A suitable prohibition would 
dispose of these transactions but the legislature 
did not do this. It took care of the situation by 
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providing (1) that each itew involved must be 
deemed offe-red for sale; (2) that each item must 
be considered separately in relation to the cost 
and price provisions and (3) that the total price 
for the sale at a combined price or the sale with 
a gift added must measure up to the aggregate 
cost of the goods. If on this basis the transaction 
falls below the standards bearing on the relation 
between cost and price there is a violation. If not, 
there is none." 
We subrnit that Sec. 13-5-9, although not worded as 
precisely as the Wisconsin statute, is designed to accom-
plish exactly the same result, that is, requiring- the cost 
of each item to he separately computed whether offered 
for a combination price, as a bonus for purchase of a 
certain item or for an additional one-cent (1¢) or some 
other nominal amount on condition that another item is 
purchased at the same time. 
In making the sale of a bag full of groceries, the 
grocer does not take, for example, the fifteen articles 
purchased and compute the cost of the total. It is com-
nwn and accepted ]mowledge that each article carries 
its own markup, each of which is computed at the check-
out counter in arriving at the total purchase price. Bush 
himself testified that he followed such a practice (R.153). 
In other words, with the exception of combination sales 
and similar devices covered by Section 13-5-9, U.C.A. 
1953, the below cost provision of the statute is computed 
as to each item sold independently of other items which 
may be sold at the same time to the same purchaser. 
No other conclusion is possible in view of the terms of 
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Section 13-5-7 which states in part: 
"It shall be unlawful for any person engaged 
in business within the State of Utah to sell, offer 
for sale, or advertise for sale, any article, product 
or commodity at less than the cost thereof to such 
vendor, • • •.'' 
\'l e respectfully submit that unless the below cost 
provisions of the Unfair Practices Act are construed 
to apply to each item sold, the Act could be so easily 
evaded that it would become a nullity; and therefore 
we petition the Court for a modification and clarification 
of their present opinion in respect to this question. 
POINT III 
THE COURT ERRONEOUSLY ASSUMED THAT IN THIS 
PROCEEDING FOR AN INJUNCTION, A CIVIL NOT A 
CRIMINAL REMEDY, PROOF BEYOND A REASONABLE 
DOUBT WAS REQUIRED. 
This case was decided upon the ground, as stated 
by this Court, "that no prima facie case was established 
showing that Bush intended to violate the Act-certainly 
not beyond a reasonable doubt." The Court refers again 
to criminal intent as follows: 
"Nor can a criminal· intent be proved by 
adding to such loss the Commission's suggestion 
that people normally do not admit violations of 
law." 
And further when it said: 
"Incredible it seems that one would intend 
to violate a criminal statute by * • ., (Emphasis 
added). 
This prornpts petitioner to call the Court's attention 
17 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
to the fact that the statute in question is not in its 
entirety, a penal statute which would require the appli-
cation of the criminal rule of evidence, viz., that the 
intent with which the violation of the act was accom-
plished must be shown by evidence which will convince 
the trier of the facts beyond a reasonable doubt that 
Bush had for his purpose the injuring of competitors 
and the destruction of competition. The statute is both 
penal and remedial in nature. Please note the provisions 
of 13-5-14 U.C.A., 1953, wherein injunctive relief and 
damages are made available to any person and the State 
of Utah and wherein any plaintiff may subpoena the 
books and records of any defendant, but that the infor-
mation acquired from production in court of such books 
and records may not "be used against the defendant 
as a basis for a misdemeanor prosecution under the 
provisions of this act." We think it clear, from the 
remedial provisions of this Act, and from the mischief 
intended by the Legislature to be remedied, that the only 
time the criminal rule of evidence can be applied is 
when procedurely, resort is had to the penal provisions 
of the statute. The Unfair Practices Act unquestionably 
falls within that category dealt with in 50 Am. Jur., 
Statutes, Sec. 423, as follows: 
"Some statutes are declared to be remedial 
as well as penal, and therefore to be entitled to a 
liberal construction to suppress the mischief and 
effect the object of the statute. On the other hand, 
it has been declared that penal provisions must 
be construed as such, although the general pur-
pose or aim of the statute may be rernedial. Simi-
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larly, it has been asserted that a statute which is 
penal, as well as ren1edial in its nature, must be 
construed with at lea8t a reasonable degree of 
strictness with respect to including anything be-
yond the imn1ediate scope and object of the stat-
ute, even though within its spirit, so that nothing 
may be added to the act by inference or in tend-
Inent. Another rule which has received some sup-
port is that where a statute contains remedial 
and penal features, as respects the fonner it is 
entitled to a liberal construction, but as to the 
latter it must be strictly construed." 
Fron1 the foregoing citation and the provisions of 
the statute itself we think it plainly apparent that when 
civil procedures are instituted under the provisions of 
the .Act by any person or the State of Utah, it must 
follow that the statute cannot be construed as penal and 
thus require adherence to the strict rules of the criminal 
law. 
The Legislature could have made it mandatory that 
a petitioner for injunctive relief establish its burden of 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt, but it did not. 
A cmnplete answer to this question is to be found in 
the case of Fainblatt v. Leo Sportswear Co. (1942), 178 
Misc. 760, 36 N.Y.S. 2nd 695. Therein the court was 
called upon in an action under a "fair trade" law, to 
decide the very question upon which your petitioner 
takes issue with this Honorable Court, viz., when apply-
ing for injunctive relief under a statute which also pro-
vides criminal prosecution for the same acts sought to 
be enjoined, must the petitioner for injunctive relief be 
held to establish criminal intent on the part of the de-
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fendant and prove defendant's intentional violation of 
the statute beyond a reasonable doubt~ The New York 
Court said "No" and in part had this to say: 
"It is true that this is a penal statute hut it 
is also a hybrid of civil and criminal remedies, 
yet capable of definite severance, the one from 
the other. Thus that part of it which relates to 
and grants civil remedy must be read separate 
and distinct from that part of it which is penal in 
character and viewed as a separate and inde-
pendent enactment and construed and interpreted 
accordingly." 
"In a formal civil action for injunctive relief 
the elements of criminal intent and reasonable 
doubt are irrelevant, immaterial and unnecessary 
and I arn unable to see that these elements he-
come relevant, by a summary proceeding incon-
gruously allied with a penal law." 
Accord: In Re Julius Restur(JJJ1;t, Inc. v. Lombardi, 
282 N.Y. 126, 25 N.E. 2d 874; State ex rel Malone v. 
Fleming Co., 164 Kan. 723, 192 P. 2d 207. 
Therefore, must we not conclude that the equitable 
remedies allowed by the statute should be secured under 
well established rules of evidence pertaining to such 
remedies~ We think this conclusion inescapable, and in 
consequence, that petitioner establishes his burden of 
proof with evidence of merit and greater weight as in 
other cases of the same nature. It is submitted petitioner 
has so established his case. 
We think the Court in error when it resolves the 
appeal of. this case on the same ground it would had 
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defendant been charged with and convicted of a crirne. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT ERRONEOUSLY DETERMINED THAT AN 
INTENT TO INJURE COMPETITION WAS NOT PROVED. 
The statute declares that a sale below cost, made 
with the intent or the effect of injuring competition and 
not within one of the exemptions, is unlawful. It was 
stipulated that no exemption, except possibly subsection 
(d) of Section 13-5-12, U.C.A. 1953, was applicable (R. 
58-59). No proof of subsection (d) was offered and, 
indeed, this· exemption was expressly negatived by evi-
dence that the price situation was staJble prior to the 
issuance of the green stamps by Bush (R. 62, 83, 97, 98)~ 
We have discussed the issue of whether a sale below 
cost was 1nade in Point I and will discuss the question 
of whether the effect of the issuance of green stamps 
injured competition in Point V. The present argument 
is limited solely to the question of intent to injure com-
petition. 
\Vhat does intent mean in this statute~ As far as 
the mere act of selling goes, it is the same whether the 
sale is made above cost or below cost. It is only realistic 
to say that the intent in making both types of sales is also 
the same. Cutting the price of a twelve percent item by 
reducing the markup to six per cent, which is lawful, 
may be done with the same intent as cutting the price of a 
six per cent item by reducing the markup to three per 
cent, which is unlawful. In other words, malice is not 
necessary. It is unrealistic in fact and contrary to what 
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the Legislature must have known when the Act was pass-
ed to say that malice, i.e., ill-will or an evil design, is 
required. Any seller when cutting prices does not in 
fact differentiate in his mind between six per cent items 
and items above six per cent. His purpose is the same 
in both instances: to attract business by taking customers 
away from his competitors. Therefore, the only intent 
necessary is that the act of price cutting was knowingly 
done by the seller with knowledge of the ordinary con-
sequences of such actions on his competitors. 
The distinction which should not be overlooked is 
th~ t the Legislature, in the proper exercise of its police 
powers, declared that one of these methods of attracting 
business, selling below cost, is unfair competition and 
unlawful. The Legislature recognized that cutting prices 
is a legitimate and ordinary business practice, a normal 
method of competition basic to our free enterprise 
system; but they also recognized one evil of unrestrained 
cmnpetition, cutting prices below cost, must be prohibited 
or the competitive system itself could be destroyed. 
We have used the statement "intent to attract busi-
ness" instead of "intent to injure competition." The 
Court places great reliance on this terminology in its 
opinion. The latter phrase has an unsavory connotation 
in that it seems unjust to accuse a seller of intending 
to injure competition when he is conducting what is 
apparently a normal and legitimate business practice 
of cutting prices to attract customers. Yet in the instant 
fact situation the terms are synonymous. They obviously 
mean different things where the price cutter does not in 
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fact have any con1petitors. But where a cmnpetitive 
situation exists, as is apparent front the facts here, it is 
ridiculous to say that intending to attract business with-
out caring whether the customers come from a competitor 
(R. 5:2-53, 55, 223-221) and that some did come from his 
competitors to his knowledge (R. 55) is not the same 
as intending to injure competition. Where a competitive 
situation does exist, any method of attracting business 
such as ilnproving the physical facilities of the store, 
conducting an accelerated advertising campaign, improv-
ing service, cutting prices and any number of other 
methods does in fact and in purpose injure competition. 
As stated in State v. Langley, 53 Wyo. 33'2, 84 P. 2d 767 
at 774: 
"A man * • * has the undoubted and inherent 
right, in order to make a living, to esta!blish an 
ordinary business in a community. He will na-
turally and inevitably injure a competitor or com-
petitors already there. The newcomer would not 
engage in his venture except with the thought 
that he would be able to get some of the business 
away from the others. IIe has in all such cases, 
in the very nature of things, the specific intent to 
injure the latter, and in most instances, if not 
all, to drive out competition as nearly as he is 
able to do so." 
Therefore, the fact that Bush stated his only in-
tent was to attract business does not disprove the intent 
required by the Act. On the contrary, that statement, 
coupled with his statements that he intended to attract 
customers even if they came from his competitors, and 
that smne customers did come from his competitors to 
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his knowledge, amounts to an ad1nission that he did 
intend to injure competitors. 
Furthermore the Court has ignored the well accepted 
rule of law, applicable to both civil and criminal cases, 
''that every sane man is presumed to intend the ordi-
nary, natural, probable, or necessary consequences of 
his voluntary, intentional, and deliberate act." 20 Am . 
. Jur., Evidence, sec. 232. 
"Wrongful intent need not and ordinarily 
cannot, be established by direct evidence. 'In the 
nature of things this would be so, for persons 
about to engage in unlawful or questionable 
undertakings are not likely to proclaim their pur-
poses on the housetops.' Such wrongful intent, 
however, may be inferred from the defendant's 
acts, sometimes even despite his 'sworn protes-
tations.' Only the acts themselves evidence the 
defendant's intent, and the courts must be guided 
accordingly. * * * When a defendant is charge-
able with knowledge of the inevitable conse-
quence of his conduct, it is a proper inference 
that he intends them. F'or a person is ordinarily 
held to intend the consequences of his acts, when 
he understands his acts, and they are deliberate, 
especially'." 
( Callman, Unfair Competition and Trade 
Marks, 2nd Ed. Vol. 4, 389.2(b)) 
Even if the denials of Bush as to his intent are 
given the full effect claimed for by appellants of nega-
tiving the element of intent, his denials stand alone 
against the otherwise uncontradicted evidence that the 
issuance of stamps by Bush caused a decline in business 
and a ruinous price war to the injury of his competitors. 
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If the courts were to discount abundant and uncontra-
dicted evidence of the deliberate acts of a defendant 
merely because the same defendant had testified he did 
not intend the consequences of his acts, intent could 
never be proved. 
"Wrongful intent is an extremely narrow 
concept. It refers only to an unlawful act inten-
tionally done with full knowledge of its unlaw-
fulness. However, it should be recognized that 
a defendant, who knows all the facts hut fails 
to appreciate the unlawfulness of his act, is still 
at fault, and his fault is tantamount to a wrong-
ful intent. It is conceivable that a defendant 
1nay not understand the law, that he may be 
failing with respect to moral or ethical values, 
that he may lack the insight to appreciate the 
facts or the inevitable consequences of his act, 
or that he may be blinded by the intensity of the 
competitive struggle. He should, however, be 
answerable for his conduct notwithstanding. 
( Callman, supra, ~389.2 (a) ) 
Bush admitted that by issuing stamps he wanted 
to attract business, to attract as many customers as pos-
sible whether they came from his competitors or not. 
(R. 52, 53, 223-227). Bush also testified as follows 
(R.45): 
"Q. Mr. Bush, is the contract that you have with 
Sperry and Hutchinson in the nature of an 
exclusive franchise, or could your competi-
tors likewise get contracts for the issuance 
of Green Stamps~ 
A. You see, at the time I took on the stamps, 
the one thing I was concerned about in pay-
ing out this money I would have to pay out 
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for the stamps, that it certainly wouldn't be 
a good thing for me if every store were able 
to get the same thing, so I asked for exclu-
sions in this, which they do give, and that 
is what I insisted on before I took the stamps 
on. 
MR. RAMPTON: And what area do you have 
"exclusive"~ 
A. I have an area of fifteen blocks within each 
one of my stores, * * * " (Emphasis supplied) 
Obviously, Bush had in mind his competitors and the 
actual effect on his competitors when he insisted on 
this monopoly provision in his contract. 
The consequences of the issuance of the stamps by 
Bush are also clear. His competitors testified that their 
volume of business declined (R. 63-64, 76-77). Mr. Van 
W agenen believed his decline would force him out of 
business (R. 77). Former customers of the competitors 
began trading with Bush (R. 76). Some customers of 
his competitors requested the competitors to install a 
stamp system of their own. (R. 78). The competitors 
attributed their decline in business to the issuance of 
the stamps by Bush (R. 64-65, 78). On the other hand, 
Bush had a substantial increase in his business after 
the stamps were issued (R. 55) and he attributed his 
increase to the stamps (R. 56). Also undisputed is tes-
timony that a price war, one of the evils of the statute 
was designed to prevent, resulted from the issuance of 
the green stamps (R. 65-66, 72-74, 85-87, 97, 99). 
The testimony of this cause and effect is unchal-
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lenged. It is the te~timony of grocers, men who speak 
from actual experience in the grocery business and not 
from abstractions. It is clear fr01n this testimony that 
in the competitive retail grocery business, a discount 
from the price, even in cents or a fraction thereof, · 
normally results and did result in a price war, trying 
to undersell the other fellow regardless of the actual 
or statutory cost of the item sold. Particularly is this 
so in the case of six per cent Inerchandise which Mr. 
Bush affirms on page 152 of the Record when he says 
he "stays~· with the lowest priced advertised, "par-
ticularly on six per cent merchandise." 
\V" e believe the cases support our interpretation of 
the intent requirement. In People v. Payless Drug, 143 
P.2d 762, quoted at length in respondent's first brief, it 
was held an intent to injure competition was proved 
Ly testimony of competitors that their business fell off 
as a result of defendant's price cutting, that a price 
war resulted, and, that the natural effect of selling 
below cost by one merchant was to lessen the business 
of his competitors. On appeal the Supreme Court of 
California, 25 Cal. 2d 108, 153 P.2d 9 at 12, affirmed 
relying on the statutory presumption of intent without 
men(ion of the specific evidence of intent. However, 
the court stated that by the presumption "The Legis-
lature merely enacted into law what is common in human 
experience, that when a person causes injury by his 
act he should be deemed to intend such consequences 
unless he can excuse or explain his conduct by facts 
showing he had an innocent intent." (Emphasis added). 
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Similar evidence was held sufficient to support an 
injunction in People v. Gordon, 105 Cal. App. 2d 711, 
234 P.2d 287. Contrary results were apparently reached 
in Sandler v. ·Gordon, 94 Cal. App. 2d 254, 210 P.2d 314, 
and Ell-is v. Dallas, 113 Cal. App. 2d 234, 248 P. 2d 63. 
llowever in the former case the facts showed that ap-
parently the alleged violator was in good faith attempt-
ing to meet the prices of his competitors and thus came 
within a statutory exemption and in the latter case 
the facts showed that when the price cutting took place 
there were no competitors to injure in the area of de-
fendant's store and therefore could be no intent to 
injure competition. Balzer v. Caler, 11 Cal. 2d 724, 82 
P.2d 19, also appears to reach a contrary result but it 
was dependent in part on the recognized judicial policy 
of supporting the trial court's decision on questions of 
fact and seems in conflict with the later case of People 
v. Payless Drug, supra. 
In Dikeou, et al. v. Food Distributors' Association, 
107 Colo. 38, 108 P.2d 529, intent was found from evi-
dence of injury to competitors, advertising the specific 
reductions complained of to· new customers, lack of 
cooperation in establishing cost surveys allowed under 
the Colorado act and other evidence not specifically 
enu1nerated in the Supreme Court opinion. The court 
stated, "It may be presumed in a civil action that the 
natural and probaJble consequences of the act were 
intended by the actor." 
The later Colorado case of Perkins v. King Soopers, 
Inc., 122 Colo. 263, 221 P.2d 343, does not change the 
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rules announced in the Dikeou ca8e for in the Perkins 
case, unlike Dikeou and this case, no evidence was intro-
duced to show the effect of the below cost sales. The 
plaintiff relied exclusively on the statutory presumption 
of intent and this was held to be insufficient in the 
Perkins case. Board of Railroad Comm'rs v. Sawyers' 
Stores, 114 Mont. 562, 138 P.2d 964, and State v. Twen-
tieth Century Jlarket, 236 Wise. 215, 294 N.W. 875 are 
like the Perkins case and distinguishable from the pres-
ent one in that no evidence was offered of the actual 
effect of the below cost sales of the defendant. 
Also distinguishable are State ex rel Anderson v. 
Commercial Ca-ndy Co., 166 Kan. 432, 201 P.2d 1034, 
where defendants proved they came within an exemp-
tion to the statute, State ex rel Malone v. Fleming Co., 
164 Kan. 723, 192 P.2d 207, where the complaint was 
held insufficient for indefiniteness, and Miller's Groce-
teria Co. v. Food Distributor's Association, 107 Colo. 
113, 109 P.2d 637, where a judgment on the pleadings 
was denied because the fact question of intent was in 
lSSUe. 
Finally, this Court has held that intent may be 
pro\-ed frmn the circumstances and __ consequences of 
actions of the defendant. In Hi-Land Dairyman's Asso-
ciation v. Cloverleaf Dairy, 107 Utah 68, 151 P.2d 710, 
this Court relied on a quotation from Helmet Co. v. 
Wm. Wrigley, Jr. Co., 245 Fed. 831: "The defendant 
is therefore chargeable with knowledge of the inevitaJble 
consequences of such conduct, and so is open to the 
inference that it intends its products to be confused 
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with and mistaken for complainant's products." It is 
true that case involved a different aspect of unfair 
competition, trade-marks, but the same intent to injure 
a cornpetitor was a necessary element of the claimed 
violation. 
We respectfully submit that if we have not proved 
the requisite intent in this case, there is no case in 
which it can be proved, absent a stipulation by the de-
fendant. In any case, the defendant can testify that 
his only intent was to attract business, and, under the 
present opinion of the Court, that alone would be enough 
to exempt him from the operation of the statute re-
gardless of the actual circumstances of the case. We 
might say of this result: The construction was success-
ful, the statute died. Therefore, we request the Court 
to reconsider their discussion of" intent, to reverse the 
present opinion as being in error, but in any event, to 
modify the language used so that in the future the Act 
can be enforced. 
POINT V 
THE COURT IGNORED AN ALTERNATIVE METHOD 
OF PROOF OF THE VIOLATION, PROOF THAT THE 
EFFECT WAS TO INJURE COMPETITION. 
Section 13-5-7, U.C.A. 1953, after spelling out the 
prohibited practice of selling below cost, continues: 
" * * * for the purpose of injuring competi-
tors and destroying competition, or of mislead-
ing the public, or when the effect of selling, offer-
ing for sale, or advertising for sale such article, 
product or commodity at less than cost thereof 
to such vendor * * * may be substantially to 
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le~~en c01npetition or tend to erPatp a monopoly 
in any line of conuueree." 
Thus, the .. Act proYides that a violation may be 
proved ( 1) by proof of intent to injure competition 
plus proof of a below co~t sale, offer or advertisement 
for sale, and also \2) by proof of a below cost sale, 
offer or adYertisen1ent for sale plus proof that the 
effect of ~uch practice was to lessen competition or 
tend to create a monopoly. In our discussion of Point 
IY, we haYe shown that the issuance of the green stamps 
by Bush (the Lelow cost sale) had the effect of reduc-
ing the business of his competitors and causing an in-
jurious price war. 
The ~Iinnesota Unfair Practices Act is very similar 
to the r tah Act and provides that a sale below cost 
is unlawful if done "for the purpose or with the effect 
of injuring competitors * * * ." The Supreme Court of 
:Minnesota held in McElhone v. Geror, 207 Minn. 580, 
29:2 xw 414: 
"Sales below cost which have the effect of 
injuring competition are prohibited regardless of 
intent." 
The same result was reached in May's Drug Stores v. 
State Tax Commission, 242 Iowa 319, 45 NW 2d 245, 
Rust v. Griggs, 172 Tenn. 565, 113 SW 2d 733; and 
Mcintire v. Borofsky, 95 N.H. 174, 59 A.2d 47. 
\V e submit that from the record of this case both 
an intent to injure competition and that the effect of 
defendant's actions was substantially to lessen compe-
tition has been proved. Proof of either is sufficient 
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under the Act to constitute a violation. By completely 
ignoring this aspect of the case, the Court has com-
mitted error. 
POINT VI 
THE PURPOSES OF THE UNFAIR PRACTICES ACT 
ARE TO PROHIBIT UNFAIR AND DISCRIMINATORY 
PRACTICES BY WHICH FAIR AND HONEST COMPETI-
'l'ION IS DESTROYED OR PREVENTED AS WELL AS TO 
SAFEGUARD THE PUBLIC AGAINST THE CREATION OR 
PERPETRATION OF MONOPOLIES. 
This Court has said in the instant case 'the declared 
purpose of the Act [is] to safeguard the public against 
·monopolies by prohibiting unfair and discriminatory 
practices by which fair and honest competition is de-
stroyed." 
It is the contention of petitioner that this inter-
pretation is an unjustified restriction upon the plain 
and unequivocal terms of the statute, which we here-
with set forth: 
"13-5-17. The legislature declared that the 
purpose of this act is to safeguard the public 
against the creation or perpetration of monopo-
lies and to foster and encourage competition, by 
prohibiting unfair and discriminatory practices 
by which fair and honest competition is destroyed 
or prevented. This act shall be liberally construed 
that its beneficial purposes may be subserved." 
Plainly, the Legislature declared at least two distinct 
purposes to be accomplished by the statute. One is 
directed against the "creation or perpetration of monopo-
lies" and the other "to foster and encourage competi-
tion, by prohibiting unfair and discriminatory practices 
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by which fair and honest competition is destroyed or 
prevented". 
Even the prohibitory language of the Unfair Prac-
tices Act does not restrict the purposes of the statute 
as this Court has done. Section 13-5-7, U.C.A. 195i~ 
declares a sale ·below cost to be illegal when the pur-
pose of such a sale is to ( 1) injure cornpetitors and 
destroy competition; (2) mislead the public; or 
(3) when the effect of such a sale may be substantially 
to lessen competition; or ( 4) when the effect of such 
a sale may be to tend to create a monopoly. l~..,urther­
more the policy section quoted above provides that the 
Act 'shall be liberally construed that its beneficial pur-
poses may be subserved. Certainly it does not subserve 
the purposes of the statute to limit its application to 
the prevention of monopolies. 
To compress the language setting forth the pur-
poses of the Act into a single concept is to deny sub-
stance and meaning to those words specifically refer-
ring to the fostering and encouraging of competition 
by prohibiting unfair and discriminatory practices irre-
spectve of the creation or perpetration of monopolies. 
Such a construction strips the statute of one of the 
powers the Legislature designed it to have, viz., the 
prevention of trade practices which are injurious to 
retail merchandising, therefore injurious to the economy, 
even though they may not be shown to create or per-
petrate a monopoly. Statutes prohibiting sales below 
cost are not merely anti-monopoly acts as this Court 
infers but are manifold in their purposes. As set forth 
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1n Wisconsin Unfair Sales Act, Sec. 100-30, Laws of 
Wisconsin, as amended: 
"The practice of selling certain i terns of 
rnerchandise below cost in order to attract patron-
age is generally a form of deceptive advertising 
and an unfair method of competition in com-
merce. Such practice causes commercial . dislo-
cations, misleads the consummer, works back 
against the farmer, directly burdens and obstructs 
comrnerce and diverts business from dealers who 
rnaintain a fair price policy. Bankruptcies among 
merchants who fail because of the con1petition of 
those who use such methods result in unemploy-
rnent, disruption of leases, and nonpayment of 
taxes a~d loans, and contribute to an inevitable 
train of undesirable consequences including eco-
nomic depression." 
CONCLUSION 
Petitioners respectfully submit 
(1) that a two per cent cash discount given with an 
item marked up the statutory six per cent does 
reduce the price of the item below the mini-
mum allowed by statute whether such a dis-
count is customary or not and regardless of the 
manner in which it is treated for accounting 
purposes; 
(2) that the below-cost provisions of the Unfair 
Practices Act apply to each item sold and there-
fore the cost of each item must be computed 
separately; 
( 3) that it is erroneous and not according to law 
to require the same burden of proof in this 
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case, a civil action for injunctive relief, as in 
a crilninal case ; 
( 4) that the record conclusively shows the intent 
of the defendant to injure cOin petition; 
( 5) that the record conclusively shows that the ef-
fect of defendant's actions was to injure com-
petition; 
( 6) that the purpose of the Unfair Practices Act 
is to promote fair methods of competition by 
the prevention of unfair methods and is not 
limited to the prevention of practices tending 
to promote monopolies. 
For the foregoing reasons, we petition the Court 
for a rehearing of this matter so that the record may 
be reconsidered and, upon further hearing, the errors 
herein specified may be corrected and the decree of the. 
trial court affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
E. R. CALLISTER 
Attorney General 
H. R. WALDO, JR. 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
and Respondent. 
SHERMAN P. LLOYD 
QUENTIN L. R. ALSTON 
RICHARD J. MAUGHAN 
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